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ABSTRACT 
Establishing the external validity of laboratory experiments in terms of inflation forecasts is crucial 
for policy initiatives to be valid outside the laboratory. Our contribution is to document whether 
different measures of inflation expectations based on various categories of agents (participants 
to experiments, households, industry forecasters, professional forecasters, financial market 
participants and central bankers) share common patterns by analyzing: the forecasting 
performances of these different categories of data; the information rigidities to which they are 
subject; the determination of expectations. Overall, the different categories of forecasts exhibit 
common features: forecast errors are comparably large and autocorrelated, forecast errors and 
forecast revisions are predictable from past information, which suggests the presence of 
information frictions. Finally, the standard lagged inflation determinant of inflation expectations is 
robust to the data sets. There is nevertheless some heterogeneity among the six different sets. If 
experimental forecasts are relatively comparable to survey and financial market data, central bank 
forecasts seem to be superior.  
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the formation of economic agents’ inflation expectations is crucial for the conduct of 
monetary policy. Recently a growing macro-experimental literature has focused on inflation 
expectations formation in the laboratory. Laboratory experiments – in particular Learning-to-Forecast 
Experiments (LtFE)1 (see Hommes (2011) for a survey) – are used to validate expectations hypotheses 
and learning models. These experiments may also serve as an important tool for central bankers, by 
providing a test-bed for competing policy actions or monetary policy rules (Cornand and Heinemann, 
2014, 2018). The external validity of expectations is critical for policy initiatives to be valid outside the 
laboratory (Duffy, 2008).2 
The question of how agents form inflation expectations is generally studied owing to survey data on 
expectations of future inflation. Survey data present the advantages (over experimental data) to 
provide ‘natural’ expectations, that are, in principle, more representatively sampled and should be 
subject to more external validity. However, they present the inconvenience to pay a fixed reward, 
implying that there is no incentive for economic agents to provide an answer that is as accurate as 
possible.3 Extracting expectations from financial instruments (such as swaps) provides a response to 
the lack of incentives. But they are no direct observations of expectations and their extrapolation may 
interfere with biases or other uncontrolled elements (yielding a problem of testing joint hypotheses). 
While survey measures are not directly linked to financial decisions, market-based measures 
incorporate liquidity or risk premia. In contrast, laboratory experiments provide data on expectations 
that respond to incentives. They also offer data, whose generating process is perfectly known by the 
experimenter and provide the experimenter with a large number of independent observations.4 
Overall, all inflation expectations data (experimental data, market-based data, survey data and central 
bank data) have some relative advantages and drawbacks, and provide an overview of how economic 
agents form inflation expectations, how successful they are in forming these forecasts, how much 
these expectations are rational (or depart from rationality), to what extent they are subject to 
information rigidities, and what variables enter their determination. 
The debate on the external validity of experimental inflation forecasts echoes the issue – pointed by 
Carroll (2003) among others – of the heterogeneity between the inflation expectations of various 
categories of agents – professional forecasters, industrial forecasters, central bankers, households, 
financial market participants –  and how each of these groups form expectations. While the literature 
has provided some comparisons of survey measures of inflation expectations (see e.g. Thomas (1999) 
                                                   
1 In LtFE, participants in the experiment play the role of professional forecasters. Their task is to provide their expectation 
about an economic variable (for example the market price or in the case we are interested in, inflation). Their payoffs depend 
negatively on their forecast error. The expectations that are formed by subjects in the laboratory are aggregated (either by 
mean or median) and this summary statistic is introduced into the theoretical model as the aggregate expectation of agents. 
Most recent experiments on DSGE models use variants of the standard three equations: IS-curve, Phillips curve, and policy 
rule. This model is directly implemented via a computer program, except the expectations that are determined by participants 
to the experiment. The computer program derives the current values of variables conditional on the model parameters, which 
yields, period after period, time series of the main variables. 
2 External validity is particularly important for macro-experimentalists as they necessarily recourse to small-scale laboratory 
evidence. A complementary line of research consists in testing the robustness of macro-experiments when considering large 
group size (100 participants) instead of the standard 6 to 10 participants’ group size. See Hommes et al. (2018). 
3 In fact, some surveys conducted toward professionals introduce incentives to respond as accurately as possible. For 
example, the publisher of Blue Chip Economic Indicators organizes an annual dinner during which the most accurate 
forecaster of the previous year is honored and identified in later issues of the newsletter. Something similar is organized by 
the central bank of Brazil for professional inflation forecasts. 
4 See Duffy (2016, section 2.4.) for a survey of experimental evidence on expectations formation in a macroeconomic context. 
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for such a study on US data), a comparison across types of measures (survey, market-based, central 
bank, and also experimental) based on various categories of agents (including household, industry, 
professional forecasters, financial market participants, central bankers, and also participants to 
laboratory experiments) has not been examined yet. Our contribution is therefore to document 
whether different types of measures share common patterns by analyzing: 
 The forecasting performances of these different types of data (following Diebold and Mariano 
(1995), Romer and Romer (2000), Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2007)); 
 The information frictions to which they are subject (following Andolfatto, Hendry and Moran 
(2007), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015), Andrade and Le Bihan (2013)); 
 The formation process of expectations and the variables entering this process (following 
Mankiw and Reis (2002), Sims (2003), Lanne, Luoma and Luoto (2009), Pfajfar and Santoro 
(2010), Fendel, Lis and Rülke (2011), Dräger, Lamla and Pfajfar (2016)). 
While these analyses (forecasting performance, information rigidities, determination of expectation 
formation) have been conducted separately and have excluded experimental data, this paper precisely 
aims at conducting these analyses in parallel in order to have a large set of characteristic comparisons 
and at enlarging the data sets by including experimental inflation expectations. These comparisons 
intend to determine whether the various sets of inflation expectations exhibit heterogeneous or 
common patterns and thus to examine the external validity of experimental inflation forecasts. We 
therefore use standard measures of forecast characteristics, information rigidity and expectation 
formation determination that we apply to each of our different sets of expectations: 
 Assess the characteristics of forecast errors 
To this aim, we analyze for each of our different samples (experimental, survey, financial 
market and central bank data) whether forecast errors are significant in order to evaluate 
whether economic agents (participants to laboratory experiments, households, industry, 
professional forecasters, financial market participants, central bank staffs and policymakers) 
make systematic mistakes, i.e. form biased inflation expectations. We also measure the 
magnitude of absolute forecast errors in order to establish the forecasting quality of our 
different samples.   
 Assess the informational frictions affecting forecast errors 
In order to evaluate whether and to what extent expectations are formed on the basis of the 
information available to our different categories of economic agents, we study for each of our 
different samples whether forecast errors are autocorrelated, correlated to forecast revisions 
and whether forecast revisions depend on past forecast revisions. We compare how our 
different categories of agents take into account available information.   
 Evaluate the usual determinants of inflation forecasts 
We study how lagged inflation and output gap affect inflation forecasts in order to evaluate 
whether the usual determinants of inflation are used by the different considered categories of 
agents. 
While establishing the external validity of laboratory experiments in terms of inflation expectation 
represents a key step for the development of macro-experiments, especially those dealing with 
4 
  
monetary policy issues, to our knowledge, there is no available study relying on a sample of 
experimental data on inflation expectation confronting it with field data.5 The aim is also to inform the 
policymaker about the informativeness of the different types of data.  
In spite of the considerable heterogeneity among our six different categories of data, we find that the 
different datasets exhibit various common features: forecast errors are comparably large; 
autocorrelations of forecast errors are positive and significant, forecast errors and forecast revisions 
are very often predictable, which suggests the presence of information frictions; the standard lagged 
inflation determinant of inflation expectations is robust to the data sets. There is nevertheless some 
heterogeneity among the six different sets. If experimental forecasts are relatively comparable to 
survey and financial market data, central bank’s forecasts seem superior, as they do not exhibit 
systematic bias, are less autocorrelated, and hardly predictable. Excluding central bank forecasts, we 
conclude that experimental data are reasonably comparable to other data sets in the sense that 
forecast errors exhibit the same kind of bias (except for industry forecasts) and lagged forecast 
revisions enter significantly and usually negatively in forecast revisions.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 describes the empirical 
results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Data 
We collect inflation expectation forecast data for four different types of measures of inflation 
expectations (experimental data, survey data, financial market data, and central bank data) 
corresponding to six categories of agents (participants to experiments, households, industry, 
professional forecasters, financial market participants, central bank’s staffs and policymakers). We also 
collect macroeconomic data. Descriptive statistics of the different series are provided in Table A in the 
Appendix. 
We acknowledge the heterogeneity of the different datasets with respect to their forecasting horizons, 
their frequency, and the sample period considered. Regarding the horizon and frequency, while they 
may be different from one set to the other, it is worth stressing that for all categories of agents, they 
correspond to the relevant horizon and frequency for their respective usual economic decisions, while 
the forecasting horizon and frequency in experimental forecasts are abstract. Regarding the sample 
period for field data, we focus our empirical analysis on a relatively recent sample period, from 1987 
to 2017, for comparability purposes between types of agents as well as macroeconomic and structural 
environments. Two exceptions are inflation swaps that start in 2004 and Greenbook forecasts that end 
in 2012.6   
                                                   
5 Some recent papers have focused on establishing the external validity of experiments on expectation formation in a different 
manner. In particular, Armantier et al. (2015) present a study in which they compare survey data on inflation expectations 
reported by consumers to the behavior of the same subjects in a financially incentivized investment experiment. They show 
that the survey is informative: stated beliefs in the survey and experimental decisions are highly correlated and conform to 
theoretical predictions. Armantier et al. (2017) somehow mix experimental and survey methods in order to investigate how 
consumers’ inflation expectations respond to new information. They randomly provide a subset of agents with factual 
information (i.e. either past-year average food price inflation or the average forecast of next-year overall inflation in the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters). They are thus able to identify causal effects of new information on agents’ expectations. 
Our methodology and aim are different: we investigate whether experimental data share the same pattern as field data. 
6 At least for experimental, survey and central bank data, there is also some heterogeneity inside samples as the way data 
are collected (type of survey or type of design and model behind experiments) and the category of economic agents can vary. 
A priori, there is no reason for one sample to be more heterogeneous than another. 
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2.1.  Data from laboratory experiments (from various published research papers) 
We collect a sample of macro-experimental data on inflation expectations formation from published 
papers. In these experiments, participants are mainly students. 
The first paper is that of Pfajfar and Žakelj (2018), which presents a LtFE (conducted at the University 
Pompeu Fabra in Spain and the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands) based on a simple version of 
forward-looking sticky price New Keynesien model. They ask subjects to form inflation expectations 
(more precisely, a prediction of the t+1 period inflation and the 95% confidence interval of their 
inflation prediction), but no output gap expectation (instead the computer program feeds the model 
with naïve output gap expectations). The economy is subject to two types of shocks: a government 
spending shock or taste shock and a cost-push shock. They consider four different treatments, 
corresponding to four different policy rules: inflation forecast targeting, with three different degrees 
of monetary policy aggressiveness; and contemporaneous inflation targeting, with an intermediate 
degree of monetary policy aggressiveness (the target is 3%).7 Subjects observe the history of 
macroeconomic variables: at each period t, participants observe inflation, the output gap and the 
interest rate up to period t-1.8 There are 70 periods, each period corresponds to a quarter. The number 
of observations amounts to 24 independent groups. 
The second one is Adam (2007). The experiment took place at the University of Salerno in Italy and at 
the Goethe University of Frankfurt in Germany. He focuses on a monopolistic competition framework. 
Participants in the experiment play the role of firms that set prices one period in advance and have to 
form inflation forecasts 2 periods ahead (even though prices are sticky for a single period only). In any 
period t, subjects observe history of output and inflation up to period t-1, and are asked to forecast 
inflation for periods t and t+1.9 The economy is subject to shocks (mean zero white noise shock with 
small bounded support). There are 6 independent groups.10  
The third one is Cornand and M’baye (2018), who focus on a design that is very close to that of Pfajfar 
and Žakelj (2018). Their experiment relies on the same model, but the considered parameter values 
are slightly different. Cornand and M’baye asked subjects to state inflation expectations, but not 
output expectations, although the macro-model behind the experiment requires both. As in Pfajfar 
and Zakelj (2014), Cornand and M’baye assumed that firms naively expect the same level of aggregate 
output as realized in the last period. Cornand and M’baye (2018) study the role of central bank’s 
inflation target communication by comparing treatments in which the central bank explicitly 
announces its inflation target to treatments in which the central bank does not announce the target. 
They consider four treatments differing by the type of inflation targeting procedure.11 An important 
                                                   
7 Their aim is to study which targeting rule best stabilizes the economy. They find that a higher degree of monetary policy 
aggressiveness reduces the variability of inflation, but may lead to cycles and that contemporaneous inflation targeting 
outperforms inflation forecast targeting for a same degree of monetary policy aggressiveness. 
8 Regarding initial values, before the experiment starts, subjects observe inflation, the output gap, and the interest rate from 
periods -9 to 0, which are generated under the assumption of rational expectations. 
9 The experiment is in between a LtFE and a LtOE: there is an additional optimization task, but subjects neither know the 
steady state nor any feature of the underlying economy. Note that only average forecasts per group (and not individual ones) 
were available. 
10 Two treatments were considered: four sessions were subject to the high-elasticity treatment, two sessions to the low 
elasticity treatment. 
11 More precisely, these treatments are: (1) Implicit strict inflation target, in which the central bank does not announce its 
inflation target to the public and its sole objective is to stabilize inflation; (2) Explicit strict inflation target, in which the central 
bank explicitly communicates its 5% inflation target and its sole objective is to stabilize inflation; (3) Implicit flexible inflation 
target, in which the central bank does not announce its target for inflation to the public and the central bank both has an 
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point is that agents are given information about the target, so there may be a forward-looking 
component to their expectation, in contrast to Adam or Pfajfar and Žakelj. For each treatment, they 
have 4 sessions with 6 subjects each. Each session lasted for 50 periods.  
The fourth paper is Cornand and M’baye (2016), who are similar to Cornand and M’baye (2018) in 
terms of design. They consider 4 different treatments differing with respect to whether the central 
bank implemented a band or point target and differing also by the size of shocks.12 They had 4 sessions 
with 6 subjects for each treatment. Sessions lasted for 60 periods. Both experiments by Cornand and 
M’baye took place at the GATE-LAB of the University of Lyon in France.  
The fifth paper is Hommes et al. (2017), which presents a LtFE (conducted at the CREED lab at the 
University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands) based again on a simple standard version of the New 
Keynesien model, with similar characteristics as the LtFEs described above. Subjects’ task consists in 
forming both inflation and output gap expectations in period t for period t+1. They consider two 
different treatments, corresponding to the implementation of two different policy rules by the central 
bank: one in which the central bank reacts to inflation only, and one in which the central bank 
additionally reacts to the output gap.13 Subjects observe the history of macroeconomic variables (all 
realizations of inflation, output gap and interest rate) up to period t-1. There are 50 periods; the 
number of observations amounts to 43 independent groups, composed of 6 participants each. 
2.2.  Survey data 
2.2.1. Households (Michigan) 
The Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior surveys a cross section of the population 
about their expectations over the next year. Most papers using the Michigan survey cover only the 
period since 1978, during which these data have been collected monthly and on quantitative basis: 
respondents were asked to state their precise quantitative inflation expectations. Before that the 
Michigan survey was qualitative. It has been conducted quarterly since 1946, although for the first 20 
years respondents were asked only whether they expected prices to rise, fall, or stay the same. Each 
month a sample of about 500 households is interviewed, where the sample is chosen to statistically 
represent households in the US, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. The monthly phone call survey focuses 
on respondents’ perceptions and expectations regarding personal finances, business conditions and 
news regarding the economy in general, as well as macroeconomic aggregates such as unemployment, 
interest rates and inflation. Furthermore, the survey collects individual and household socioeconomic 
characteristics. 
2.2.2. Industry (Livingston) 
                                                   
inflation and an output gap stabilization objective; (4) Explicit flexible inflation target, in which the central bank explicitly 
communicates its target for inflation and the central bank both has an inflation and an output gap stabilization objective. 
12 More precisely the considered treatments were the following: (1) Band targeting with small shocks, in which the central 
bank simply announces a band inflation target (interval [4% - 6%]) to the public, in a context where shocks have a low variance; 
(2) Point targeting with small shocks, in which the central bank explicitly communicates its 5% numerical target with a 
tolerance band of +/-1% around its target in a context where the variance of shocks is low; (3) Band targeting with large 
shocks, in which the central bank simply announces the band inflation target ([4% - 6%]) to the public, but in a context where 
the variance of shocks is relatively high; (4) Point targeting with large shocks, in which the central bank explicitly 
communicates its 5% numerical target with a tolerance band of +/-1% around its target, but in a context where the variance 
of shocks is relatively high. 
13 Their aim is to test a theoretical behavioral model showing that the central bank’s reaction to output gap on top of inflation 
reduces inflation volatility. 
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The Livingston Survey was started in 1946 by the late columnist Joseph Livingston. It is the oldest 
continuous survey of economists’ expectations. It summarizes the forecasts of economists from 
industry, government and academia in the US. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took 
responsibility for the survey in 1990. The Livingston Survey covers analysts-economists working in 
industry. It is conducted twice a year, in June and December, so has a semiannual frequency. It provides 
twelve-month Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation forecasts from around 50 survey respondents.  
2.2.3. Professional forecasters (Survey of Professional Forecasters) 
The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is collected and published by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia. It focuses on professional forecasters mostly in the banking sector in the US. Surveys are 
sent to approximately 40 panelists at the end of the first month of the quarter, the deadline for 
submission is the second week of the second month of the quarter, and forecasts are published 
between the middle and end of February, May, August, and November. GDP price index forecasts 
(available since 1968) are fixed-horizon forecasts for the current and the next four quarters. They are 
provided as annualized quarter-over-quarter growth rate. We also perform our analysis with CPI 
forecasts that are provided since 1981. We consider the median of individual responses rather than 
the mean that could be affected by potential outliers. 
2.3.  Financial market instruments (swap data) 
Market-based inflation expectations are derived from inflation swaps. These instruments are financial 
market contracts to transfer inflation risk from one counterparty to another. We consider 
instantaneous forwards at different maturities that measure expected inflation at the date of the 
maturity of the contract. In general, the advantage of financial market expectations over survey 
measures of expectations is that they are directly related to payoff decisions, so there is no strategic 
response bias or no difference between stated and actual beliefs. However, one disadvantage is that 
financial market expectations do not provide a direct measure of inflation expectations as they are 
affected by credit risk, liquidity and inflation risk premia. Swaps tend to be a better market measure 
for deriving inflation expectations than inflation-indexed bonds because they are generally less 
sensitive to liquidity and risk premia. Another advantage of market-based measures is that they are 
available at the daily frequency. For comparison purposes, we also perform our analysis at the monthly 
frequency and take the average of all the working day observations in each month. These are available 
since October 2004 only for liquidity reasons. 
2.4. Central bank (Fed)  
2.4.1. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
The FOMC publishes forecasts for inflation and real GDP growth twice a year in the Monetary Policy 
Report to the Congress since 1979. Since October 2007, their publication is quarterly. We consider 
forecasts of the GDP deflator until 1988, then the Consumer Price Index until 1999 and then the 
Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) measure of inflation following the focus of the FOMC. These 
forecasts are fourth quarter-over-fourth quarter growth rates for current and next calendar years. 
Until 2005, the forecast for next year was published only a year. While each FOMC member was 
required to submit a forecast, the Monetary Policy Reports provide only summary statistics for each 
variable. In particular, they report ‘central tendency’ values, which show the highest and lowest 
forecasts after dropping the extremes (commonly defined as the three highest and three lowest values, 
although this is not consistently made clear in the reports) and the ‘range’ of forecasts listing the 
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highest and lowest values. We consider the midpoint of the ‘full range’ of all individual FOMC 
members’ forecasts, which should be more informative of all views in the FOMC than the central 
tendency. It should then also be more comparable with surveys or experimental data, that are not 
truncated. These FOMC forecasts are a mix of the model-based forecasts of the Greenbook (see below) 
and FOMC members’ judgement. 
2.4.2. Greenbook 
The ‘Greenbook’ contains the forecasts of the staff of the Federal Reserve. These forecasts are model-
based forecasts, formed and provided to the FOMC members before FOMC meetings. They are made 
available to the public after a five-year embargo and forecast different measures of inflation and real 
GDP/GNP growth at different quarterly horizons up to 1-year ahead. They are available for all horizons 
since 1969Q4 and are measured as annualized quarter-over-quarter growth rates.  
2.5. Macroeconomic data 
Regarding experimental data, macroeconomic variables (inflation and output gap) are generated by 
the computer program that implements the model of the economy, conditional on the parameters and 
on the expectations and prices that participants to the experiment are asked for depending on the 
design (inflation expectations for all experiments considered in this paper and prices for Adam only).  
For observed macroeconomic data, we use the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (FRED 
mnemonic: CPIAUCSL), the Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator Index (GDPDEF), the 
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index (PCECTPI) and the Real Gross Domestic 
Product, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars (GDPC1). 
3. Empirical evidence 
We first analyze the forecasting performances of our different types of data (inflation expectations 
from participants to laboratory experiments, households, industry, professional forecasters, financial 
market participants, central bankers). Then following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), we study to 
what extent our different samples compare to each other in terms of information rigidities and up-
dating frequency. Third, we analyze in what respect the usual determinants enter our different 
categories of inflation expectations. 
While survey data are available for a very long period of time, in order to have comparable samples 
(unbiased for informational frictions or potentially lower quality forecasts in the past), we focus on the 
relatively recent period 1987-2017.14 For laboratory experiments, we rely on more than 38,000 
observations.15  
3.1.  Forecast characteristics: bias and accuracy 
What is the forecasting performance of our different categories of economic agents: are forecast 
errors biased for the different categories of agents?16 Is their accuracy comparable? Our strategy 
                                                   
14 Results for the full sample are provided in Appendix (Tables B, C, D, E, F, G, and I). 
15 We use individual data when available as they provide more information. We nevertheless offer some robustness checks 
on Table J reported in the Appendix for comparability purpose with average survey data, midpoint central bank data and 
market clearing price swap data for financial market participants. 
16 Notice that we rely on an unconditional bias. An alternative methodology calculating a bias conditional on the perception 
of shocks is provided in Kucinskas and Peters (2018). 
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consists in analyzing whether forecast errors exhibit systematic biases before focusing on absolute 
forecast errors to establish the overall quality of these forecast errors.  
We denote by 𝜋𝑡  inflation in period t and 𝜋t+1\t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  the mean forecast across agents made in period t of 
inflation in period t+1. The forecast error at time t of inflation in period t+h is defined by: FEt,t+h ≡
𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋t+h\t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . We first test the following equation (following Romer and Romer (2000) and Ang, 
Bekaert, and Wei (2007)):  
   FEt,t+h = 𝛽1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡       (1) 
where 𝛽1 is the estimated constant, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term (i stands for the six different categories of 
economic agents (participants to laboratory experiments, households, industry, professional 
forecasters, financial market participants, central bankers)) and the null hypothesis is: the estimated 
constant 𝛽1is not significantly different from 0.  
While forecast rationality (as defined e.g. in Romer and Romer (2000)) implies that forecast errors 
should theoretically – consistently with the commonly maintained rational expectations assumption – 
be null on average, the literature however provides some evidence that this may not be the case: 
economic agents are usually prone to make persistent forecast errors.17  
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation of equation (1) for our different types of measures and 
categories of agents. In order to make results more easily comparable, Table 1 also provides forecast 
errors normalized by the standard deviation of the predicted variable (i.e. the different measures of 
inflation). A significant coefficient indicates that the forecast is biased. A positive coefficient indicates 
that economic agents underestimate inflation. 
Forecast errors are almost systematically negative in our sample of laboratory experiments: 
participants to laboratory experiments tend to overestimate inflation. However, there is some 
heterogeneity. In the data of Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017) participants instead significantly 
underestimate inflation. In the sub-samples by Adam (2008) and Cornand and M’baye (2016), the error 
is not significant; however, as will become clear below from the analysis of absolute forecast errors, 
this is due to a compensation in errors.  
The forecasts of financial market participants (extracted from inflation swaps) are always negative and 
significant. They increase with the horizon. Considering daily or monthly data does not affect these 
results. Similarly, forecast errors in the household sample are also negative and significant.  
Forecast errors of professional forecasters exhibit a slightly less clear pattern: those regarding CPI for 
the next quarter (cpi1q) are not significant, while those for the next year (cpi4q) are. GDP price index 
forecasts for the current and next quarter (pgdp1q and pdgd4q) are also significant. We conclude that 
forecast errors of professional forecasters are most of the time negative and significant. 
                                                   
17 For evidence see, e.g., Roberts (1997), Croushore (1997), Thomas (1999), and more recently Mankiw et al. (2004), and 
Mehra (2002). Notice however, that some authors point that the fact that expectations are apparently biased errors serially 
correlated, cannot be construed as evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis. Andolfatto et al. (2007) argue that 
the hypothesis of unbiasedness tends to be rejected in particular in small samples, but less often in larger samples and that 
it may be rational to be adaptive for agents when they cannot disentangle the effects of persistent and transitory shocks. 
Note finally that Romer and Romer (2000) observe that forecast rationality is insured after correcting for serial correlation, 
for almost all their data (except the Blue Chip sample, for which rationality is obtained when excluding Volcker disinflation). 
In our case, since some of the series exhibit forecast rationality, we do not control for serial correlation for comparability 
purposes so as to estimate the same regression specification in all cases. 
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By contrast, in the industry sample, forecast errors are not significant, whatever the horizon of the 
forecast (expectations at 6 months (living6m) and at 12 months (living12m)). Central bank forecasts 
are not significant either (except pce4q).  
Table 1 - Forecast errors 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW   
1 -0.009* -0.042*** -0.022 -0.116*** 0.007 0.064***   
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.13] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]   
1 (normalized) -0.005* -0.026*** -0.013 -0.072*** 0.004 0.040***   
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.08] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]   
N 38424 14904 510 4704 5664 12642   
Market-based forecasts 
 Daily Monthly average     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
 swap3y swap5y swap10y swap3y swap5y swap10y     
1 -0.766*** -1.069*** -1.920*** -0.740*** -1.060*** -1.919***     
 [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.14] [0.10] [0.15]     
1 (normalized) -0.526*** -0.735*** -1.320*** -0.508*** -0.728*** -1.318***    
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.10] [0.07] [0.10]    
N 2514 1992 687 116 92 32     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
1 0.113 -0.063 -0.406*** -0.197** -0.360*** 0.008 -0.215**   
 [0.22] [0.21] [0.06] [0.08] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10]   
1 (normalized) 0.037 -0,021 -0.143*** -0.078** -0.142*** 0.003 -0.073**   
 [0.07] [0.07] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]   
N 61 60 372 122 119 123 120   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
1 0.075 -0.051 0.032 0.035 0.2 0.263 0.286 0.558** 
 [0.07] [0.08] [0.09] [0.11] [0.15] [0.20] [0.19] [0.26] 
1 (normalized) 0.038 -0.026 0.013 0.014 0.059 0.078 0.2 0.390** 
 [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.06] [0.14] [0.18] 
N 124 120 103 100 103 100 51 48 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (1) with OLS. Market-based 
forecasts are considered at a daily or monthly frequency, Livingston has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC and 
Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018), 
Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye (2016), and HMW those from 
Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For market-based forecasts, the forecasting horizon is 3, 5 and 10 years. For surveys, the horizon for Livingston 
is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the horizon is the current and next calendar 
years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
Table B provided in the Appendix performs robustness checks. Results exhibit less clear patterns for 
survey and central bank forecasts depending on the considered period. For a longer time period, 
forecast errors of industry and central bank become significant, while those of households and 
professional forecasters become insignificant. 
Overall, comparing our different samples: SPF forecast errors (except cpi1q), financial market 
participants’ forecast errors, households’ and laboratory experiment forecasts are consistent and 
exhibit systematic errors: inflation is over-estimated. Forecasts obtained in laboratory experiments 
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exhibit lower errors. Central bank’s and industry’s forecasts exhibit no significant results. As will 
become clear below, considering absolute forecast errors qualifies such a result. 
We secondly provide a robustness check of results from Table 1, by estimating the absolute forecast 
error. Our aim is to evaluate whether positive and negative errors possibly compensated each other 
and to determine the quality of forecasts for our different categories of agents and types of measures. 
The absolute forecast error at time t of inflation in period t+h is defined by: |FEt,t+h| ≡
|𝜋𝑡+ℎ −  𝜋t+h\t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ |. Following Romer and Romer (2000)
18 and Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) among 
others, we test the following equation:  
   |FEt,t+h| =  𝛽2 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡            (2) 
where 𝛽2 is the estimated constant, 𝜖𝑖𝑡  is the error term (i stands for the six different categories of 
economic agents) and the null hypothesis is: the estimated constant 𝛽2is not significantly different 
from 0.  
Table 2 provides estimates of equation (2) for our different samples. In order to make results more 
easily comparable, Table 2 also provides absolute forecast errors normalized by the standard deviation 
of the predicted variable (i.e. the different measures of inflation). A significant coefficient indicates 
that the absolute forecast error is significantly different from 0.  
Table 2 shows that, considering absolute forecast errors, all forecast errors (that were not already 
significant in Table 1) become significant: experimental forecast errors become all significant, 
households’ forecast errors become significant even on a long period sample, industry’s forecast errors 
become significant even on the short 1990-2017 sub-period, professional forecast errors become all 
significant but there seems to be an inconsistency as swap3y errors are larger than swap5y (both for 
daily and monthly data). Also for SPF, we see that the CPI prevision is better than the GDP deflator at 
one year.19 In terms of accuracy (as evaluated by the average magnitude of absolute forecast errors), 
forecast errors are comparable in our different data sets, especially when considering absolute 
forecast errors normalized by the standard deviation.20 They seem to be more pronounced for market-
based data and much less pronounced for experimental data (though the size of the sample may play 
a role). 
Overall, the comparison between the analyses of forecast errors and absolute forecast errors enables 
us to formulate the following result: 
Result 1: While forecast errors of participants to laboratory experiments, financial market participants, 
households and professional forecasters are systematically biased (i.e. forecasts exhibit over-
evaluation of inflation on average), those from central bank and industry surveys are not. However, for 
each type of measure (experimental, survey, financial market and central bank data) and each category 
of economic agents, the forecast accuracy in terms of absolute forecast error is comparably large.    
                                                   
18 More precisely, Romer and Romer (2000) use the Mean Squared Errors (MSE) to estimate forecast accuracy, rather than 
the absolute forecast error. 
19 These results are robust to the considered period, as shown in Table C provided in the Appendix.  
20 The fact that forecast errors are comparable also within the sample of experimental data is interesting. Because the designs 
by Cornand and M’baye focus on central bank’s inflation target communication while other experimental designs do not, we 
could have expected more heterogeneity in forecast errors. Indeed, Dräger et al. (2016) make the link between consistent 
expectations, central bank communication and forecast accuracy. More precisely, they interpret consistency as effectiveness 
of central bank communication. 
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Table 2 - Absolute forecast errors 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW     
 0.462*** 0.573*** 1.813*** 0.329*** 0.258*** 0.418***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.10] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]     
 (normalized) 0.288*** 0.357*** 1.130*** 0.205*** 0.161*** 0.260***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]     
N 38424 14904 510 4704 5664 12642     
Market-based forecasts 
 Daily Monthly average     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
 swap3y swap5y swap10y swap3y swap5y swap10y     
 1.347*** 1.217*** 1.920*** 1.340*** 1.199*** 1.919***     
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.10] [0.08] [0.15]     
 (normalized) 0.926*** 0.837*** 1.320*** 0.920*** 0.824*** 1.318***     
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.07] [0.05] [0.10]     
N 2514 1992 687 116 92 32     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
 1.184*** 1.159*** 0.870*** 0.695*** 0.837*** 0.674*** 0.843***   
 [0.16] [0.15] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]   
 (normalized) 0.392*** 0.384*** 0.307*** 0.275*** 0.331*** 0.229*** 0.286***   
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]   
N 61 60 372 122 119 123 120   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
 0.572*** 0.739*** 0.750*** 0.826*** 1.041*** 1.407*** 1.042*** 1.421*** 
 [0.04] [0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.11] [0.14] [0.13] [0.18] 
 (normalized) 0.291*** 0.376*** 0.292*** 0.322*** 0.309*** 0.417*** 0.729*** 0.994*** 
 [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.09] [0.12] 
N 124 120 103 100 103 100 51 48 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (2) with OLS. Market-based 
forecasts are considered at a daily or monthly frequency, Livingston has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC and 
Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018), 
Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye (2016), and HMW those from 
Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For market-based forecasts, the forecasting horizon is 3, 5 and 10 years. For surveys, the horizon for Livingston 
is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the horizon is the current and next calendar 
years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
A few remarks are in order. First, this result confirms the superiority of central bank’s forecasts already 
established in the literature.21 Romer and Romer (2000) – who compare the forecasting performance 
of the Federal Reserve (using Greenbook data) and of commercial banks (using Blue Chip Economic 
Indicators, Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) and SPF) – show that the Federal Reserve better forecasts 
inflation than commercial forecasters. 
Second, our first result qualifies the superiority of professional forecasts. The literature usually finds 
that professional forecasters stand in a better position than many other economic agents to forecast 
inflation (e.g. Carroll (2003)). Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2007) offer a comparison of four methods to study 
                                                   
21 Note however that this superiority should be taken with care as the number of observations is small. However, it is not 
smaller than some of the other datasets (Livingston, SPF or monthly swaps for instance) and not smaller than equivalent 
samples in the literature.  
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inflation forecasting: time series forecasts, forecasts based on the Phillips curve, forecasts from the 
yield curve, and surveys (Livingston, Michigan, and SPF). Their comparison also shows the superiority 
of survey forecasts in forecasting inflation. Nevertheless, commenting such a result, they write (p. 
1165): "That the median Livingston and SPF survey forecasts do well is perhaps not surprising, because 
presumably many of the best analysts use time-series and Phillips curve models. However, even 
participants in the Michigan survey who are consumers, not professionals, produce accurate out-of-
sample forecasts, which are only slightly worse than those of the professionals in the Livingston and 
SPF surveys.” Our results are in line with this comment and extends it to experimental data. 
Third, our first result emphasizes the performance comparability of laboratory data to various 
categories of field data: experimental forecasts are biased as other data and are not less accurate than 
other data. 
3.2.  Informational frictions and up-date frequency 
We analyze whether our different economic agents are subject to informational frictions when 
forecasting inflation and how they up-date their information. Is there some heterogeneity in these 
respects for our different categories of agents? To answer these questions, following Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012), we evaluate for our different categories of economic agents whether forecast 
errors are autocorrelated, whether they depend on forecast revisions, and whether forecast revisions 
depend on past forecast revisions. If they are, this means that economic agents do not incorporate all 
available information. Instead, if forecast errors are not predictable, economic agents use all the 
information they have and are in particular able to up-date their information set between two periods.  
First of all, to study the potential autocorrelation of forecast errors, we test the following equation:  
   FEt,t+h = 𝐶1 + 𝛽3FEt−1,t+h−1𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡       (3) 
where 𝛽3 is the estimated coefficient, 𝐶1 is a constant, 𝜖𝑖𝑡  is the error term (i stands for the six different 
categories of economic agents) and the null hypothesis is: the estimated coefficient 𝛽3is not 
significantly different from 0. Table 3 provides estimations of equation (3) for our different samples. A 
significant coefficient indicates that forecast errors are autocorrelated. 
Theoretically, in a frictionless world, forecast errors should not be correlated to previous forecast 
errors. However, in the sticky information model (Mankiw and Reis, 2002), "forecast errors depend 
both on the inflation process after the shock and on the degree of information rigidity. […] As the degree 
of information rigidity rises, conditional forecast errors will become increasingly persistent." (Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko, 2012, p. 122). There is much evidence in the literature that they are. For example, 
Diebold (1989) shows that inflation forecast errors are typically serially correlated and hence 
predictable. Romer and Romer (2000, p. 433) also show that "the serial correlation increases as the 
horizon for the forecasts becomes longer." However, more recently, evidence is mixed. Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) show that "forecast errors are not predictable using lagged inflation conditional 
on lagged forecast errors". 
Table 3 shows that forecast errors are indeed autocorrelated: the forecast error is predictable owing 
to the former error, suggesting that economic agents do not form rational expectations. This 
characteristic is robust over almost all our samples (with only a few exceptions: Industry data 
(Livingston), Greenbook data (cpi1q and pce1q)). Note that Table D reported in Appendix shows that 
for a longer period of time, autocorrelation of forecast errors on industry data also become significant. 
In terms of amplitude, market-based forecast errors seem to be more autocorrelated, while 
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Greenbook data exhibit less autocorrelation in forecast errors (although one should be careful in 
interpretation because coefficients are biased by the frequency of the sample). Considering fixed 
effects for experimental data does not yield further insights. 
Table 3 - Autocorrelation of forecast errors 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW     
β3 0.540*** 0.680*** 0.115** 0.370*** 0.229*** 0.461***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
constant -0.007* -0.010 -0.022 -0.070*** 0.007 0.020***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.13] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
N 37748 14688 500 4608 5568 12384     
R² 0.29 0.45 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.23     
Market-based forecasts 
 Daily Monthly average     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
 swap3y swap5y swap10y swap3y swap5y swap10y     
β3 0.991*** 0.993*** 0.996*** 0.912*** 0.911*** 0.929***     
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.04] [0.07]     
constant -0.008* -0.008** -0.008 -0.085 -0.096 -0.117     
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.06] [0.15]     
N 2513 1991 686 115 91 31     
R² 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.85 0.83 0.85     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
β3 -0.202 -0.102 0.898*** 0.427*** 0.548*** 0.611*** 0.744***   
 [0.13] [0.13] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06]   
constant 0.138 -0.071 -0.039 -0.112 -0.161** 0.009 -0.059   
 [0.22] [0.22] [0.03] [0.07] [0.08] [0.06] [0.07]   
N 61 60 372 122 119 123 120   
R² 0.04 0.01 0.81 0.18 0.30 0.38 0.56   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
β3 0.666*** 0.819*** 0.469*** 0.665*** 0.109 0.236** 0.223 0.321** 
 [0.07] [0.05] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10] [0.10] [0.14] [0.14] 
constant 0.027 -0.012 0.018 0.008 0.178 0.204 0.259 0.372 
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.08] [0.08] [0.15] [0.19] [0.19] [0.27] 
N 124 120 103 100 103 100 50 47 
R² 0.45 0.67 0.22 0.45 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.10 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (3) with OLS. Market-
based forecasts are considered at a daily or monthly frequency, Livingston has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. 
FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar 
and Zakelj (2018), Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye 
(2016), and HMW those from Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For market-based forecasts, the forecasting horizon is 3, 5 and 10 years. 
For surveys, the horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, 
the horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
 
Second, we analyze whether forecast errors are predictable owing to forecast revisions. The forecast 
revision at time t of inflation in period t+h is defined by: FRt,t+h ≡ 𝜋t+h\t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ −  𝜋t+h−1\t−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . We estimate 
the following equation (equivalent to equation (11) in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012)):  
    FEt,t+h = 𝐶2 + 𝛽4FRt,t+h + 𝜖𝑖𝑡             (4) 
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where 𝛽4 is the estimated coefficient, 𝐶2 is a constant,  𝜖𝑖𝑡  is the error term (i stands for the six different 
categories of economic agents) and the null hypothesis is: the estimated coefficient 𝛽4is not 
significantly different from 0. If there is no informational friction, forecast errors should theoretically 
not be correlated to forecast revisions.  
Table 4 provides estimates of equation (4) for our different samples. A significant coefficient indicates 
that the error is predictable owing to the revision.  
Errors of professional forecasters and central bankers (except pdgp1q) are not predictable (as for 
financial market participants on long horizons) owing to forecast revision, meaning that they tend to 
use more available information than other economic agents. By contrast, coefficients are significant in 
the samples of laboratory participants, industry (except linving6m) and to some extend for financial 
market participants (especially swap3y).22 Data from laboratory experiments are thus relatively 
comparable to financial market participants’ data in this respect (although the amplitude is even more 
pronounced for market-based data).  
However, there is some heterogeneity among our samples and within the sample of experiments in 
terms of signs. When economic agents revise their expectations upward between t-1 and t, this 
reduces their forecast error in industry data (when significant, i.e. on the 1956-2017 period as 
presented in Table E of the Appendix) and for the experiment by Pfajfar and Zakelj and Adam, but 
increases their forecast error in Cornand and M’baye and in Hommes, Massaro and Weber,23 in 
household data (over a long time period as exposed in table E in Appendix) and in financial market 
data on short horizons. 
Tables H and I provided in Appendix give additional precisions to Table 4 by providing a decomposition 
between current and lagged inflation forecasts following equation (12) in Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2012). In particular, in the case where previous Table 4 does not exhibit significant results, one can 
see whether one of the two (current and lagged inflation forecasts) is significant. Theoretically, without 
informational friction, they should not be (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012). The main result of Table 
4 is confirmed by Tables H and I reported in the Appendix.24  
  
                                                   
22 It seems that both industry and household data are more reliable in the recent period than in the past, as Table E in 
Appendix shows that over a longer period, forecast errors on forecast revisions on industry and household data become 
significant when they were not on a shorter period or even more significant when they were already significant. 
23 Considering fixed effects does not alter the results regarding experimental data as shown in Table E reported in the 
Appendix. 
24 Only lagged expected inflation is significant, with a negative sign for household data; expected inflation in living6m is 
significant with a negative sign for industry data; regarding central bank’s forecast, lagged expected inflation is significant on 
Greenbook data for pgdp4q, cpi1q, pce1q. 
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Table 4 - Forecast errors on forecast revisions 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW     
β4 0.066*** 0.231*** 0.314*** -0.384*** -0.365*** -0.141***     
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.07] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
constant -0.008* -0.040*** -0.017 -0.116*** 0.007 0.064***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.12] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
N 38423 14903 510 4704 5664 12642     
R² 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.18 0.02     
Market-based forecasts 
 Daily Monthly average     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
 swap3y swap5y swap10y swap3y swap5y swap10y     
β4 -0.542*** -0.453* -0.155 -0.740* -0.354 0.408     
 [0.18] [0.23] [0.68] [0.43] [0.40] [1.17]     
constant -0.767*** -1.069*** -1.920*** -0.763*** -1.061*** -1.913***     
 [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.14] [0.10] [0.16]     
N 2513 1991 686 115 91 31     
R² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
β4 -0.640* -0.75 -0.26 -0.036 0.037 -0.232 -0.59   
 [0.36] [0.48] [0.18] [0.23] [0.41] [0.19] [0.50]   
constant 0.104 -0.08 -0.406*** -0.197** -0.359*** 0.007 -0.223**   
 [0.22] [0.21] [0.06] [0.08] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10]   
N 61 60 372 122 119 123 120   
R² 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
β4 -0.182 0.295 -0.212* 0.121 0.146 -0.651 0.193 -0.549 
 [0.20] [0.39] [0.12] [0.28] [0.09] [0.72] [0.13] [1.10] 
constant 0.074 -0.049 0.029 0.037 0.203 0.248 0.329* 0.544** 
 [0.07] [0.08] [0.09] [0.11] [0.15] [0.20] [0.19] [0.27] 
N 124 120 103 100 103 100 50 47 
R² 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (4) with OLS. Market-
based forecasts are considered at a daily or monthly frequency, Livingston has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. 
FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar 
and Zakelj (2018), Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye  
(2016), and HMW those from Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For market-based forecasts, the forecasting horizon is 3, 5 and 10 years. 
For surveys, the horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, 
the horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
 
We can thus conclude that in contrast to professional and central bankers’ forecasts, for households 
and industry, forecast errors are predictable owing to forecast revisions (though less than for the other 
samples), and in the same direction as in the financial market participant sample, as well as in the same 
direction of some of the experimental sub-samples. 
Thirdly, we evaluate whether forecast revisions can be predicted owing to past forecast revisions. 
More precisely, the question we answer is whether economic agents revise their expectations upwards 
if the former forecast is revised upwards. To this aim, we test the following equation: 
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   FRt,t+h =  𝐶3 + 𝛽5FRt−1,t+h−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡       (5) 
where 𝛽5 is the estimated coefficient, 𝐶3 is a constant,  𝜖𝑖𝑡  is the error term (i stands for the six different 
categories of economic agents) and the null hypothesis is: the estimated coefficient 𝛽5is not 
significantly different from 0. 
Forecast revisions should theoretically not be correlated to lagged forecast revisions, as there is no 
reason for economic agents to always revise their forecasts in the same direction.  
Table 5 presents estimations of equation (5) for our different samples. A significant and positive 
coefficient indicates that economic agents revise their expectations upwards if the former forecast is 
revised upwards. The table exhibits significant coefficients (except for households, swap10y for 
financial market participants on monthly data, pgdp4q for professional forecasters and most central 
bank’s forecasts). The sign is generally negative (except for Pfajfar and Zakelj’s and Hommes, Massaro 
and Weber’s sub-samples in experimental data).  
Table F in Appendix overall confirms this analysis on longer periods, except for industry data that 
become non-significant and household data that become significant.25 
Overall, regarding information frictions, we can state the following result: 
Result 2:  For each type of measure and each category of agents at the notable exception of central 
bank data, inflation forecasts are subject to information rigidities. 
(a) Forecast errors are highly autocorrelated for all types of measure (experimental, survey, 
financial market, and central bank data) and each category of agents except industry 
forecasters. 
(b)  Forecast errors are predictable owing to forecast revisions – indicating that economic agents 
are unable to up-date their information between periods – except for central bank and 
professional forecasters. 
(c) Lagged forecast revisions enter significantly and usually negatively in forecast revisions for all 
types of measures and each category of agents – indicating that economic agents alternate 
revising their expectations upwards and downwards –, except for central bank data. 
Our second result calls for some comments. First, our result confirms previous studies pointing to 
evidence of information frictions. In particular, our results are in line with those of Andrade and Le 
Bihan (2013) who – relying on the European Central Bank Survey of Professional Forecasters – show 
that forecasters fail to update their forecasts and have predictable forecast errors. As argued by 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, p. 136), "because professional forecasters are some of the most 
informed economic agents, […] any evidence of information rigidity on their part [is] particularly 
notable". Our result also goes in the direction of those of Romer and Romer (2000) emphazising the 
idea that staff and policymakers from the Fed form better forecasts than professional (commercial) 
forecasters.  
                                                   
25 Considering fixed effects does not alter the results regarding experimental data as shown in Table F reported in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 5 - Forecast revisions on lagged forecast revisions 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW     
β5 0.078*** 0.258*** -0.156*** -0.471*** -0.441*** 0.051***     
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
constant -0.001 -0.008 -0.011 -0.019 0.001 0.019***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.08] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
N 37748 14687 500 4608 5568 12385     
R² 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.25 0.21 0.00     
Market-based forecasts 
 Daily Monthly average     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
 swap3y swap5y swap10y swap3y swap5y swap10y     
β5 -0.310*** -0.223*** -0.268*** -0.353*** -0.278*** -0.103     
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]     
constant 0 0 0 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006     
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]     
N 3295 3295 3295 150 150 150     
R² 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.01     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
β5 -0.466*** -0.432*** -0.075 -0.188** -0.126 -0.230** -0.176**   
 [0.11] [0.12] [0.05] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09]   
constant -0.025 -0.032 -0.001 -0.009 -0.014 -0.011 -0.015   
 [0.07] [0.05] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.02]   
N 62 62 373 124 124 124 124   
R² 0.22 0.19 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
β5 0.004 -0.039 -0.408*** -0.173* -0.237** 0.014 -0.218 0.122 
 [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.14] [0.14] 
constant -0.004 -0.007 -0.014 -0.015 -0.029 -0.021 -0.045 -0.013 
 [0.03] [0.02] [0.07] [0.04] [0.15] [0.03] [0.20] [0.03] 
N 124 124 104 104 104 104 50 50 
R² 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.02 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (5) with OLS. Market-
based forecasts are considered at a daily or monthly frequency, Livingston has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. 
FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar 
and Zakelj (2018), Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye  
(2016), and HMW those from Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For market-based forecasts, the forecasting horizon is 3, 5 and 10 years. 
For surveys, the horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, 
the horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
 
Second, in spite of differences in economic context (long vs. short period of time, including data from 
a potentially less vs. more transparent period of time) and design regarding experimental data sets (for 
exemple, with vs. without communication about a forward-looking variable such as the central bank 
target in Cornand and M’baye vs. Pfajfar and Zakelj and Hommes, Massaro and Weber) that could have 
induced more or less informational frictions, our results are relatively consistent within samples. The 
most important heterogeneity in results is observed when regressing forecast errors on forecast 
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revisions (Result 2 (b)) and can possibly be attributed to these differences in economic context and 
design.26  
3.3.  Forecast determination 
Are inflation forecasts’ determinants the usual ones (namely lagged inflation and output gap) for each 
of our different categories of economic agents? To answer this question, in line with e.g. Lanne et al. 
(2009), Fendel et al. (2010), and Dräger et al. (2016), we test the following equation: 
   𝜋t+1\t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝐶4 + 𝛽6𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑦𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡    (6) 
where 𝛽6 and 𝛽7  are the estimated coefficients, 𝑦𝑡 denotes the output gap in period t, 𝐶4 is a constant, 
 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term (i stands for the six different categories of economic agents). Based on the 
standard Phillips curve relationship, we expect inflation forecasts to be determined by lagged inflation 
and output gap. 
  
Table 6 - Forecast determination 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All obs. All w/o PZ PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 
6 0.928*** 0.314*** 0.943*** -0.248*** 0.646*** 0.617*** 
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] 
OG . -0.333*** . -0.560*** -0.390*** -0.064*** 
   [0.01]   [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] 
constant 0.314*** 3.437*** 0.200*** 4.973*** 1.845*** 1.884*** 
 [0.01] [0.05] [0.02] [0.09] [0.13] [0.07] 
N 25782 10879 14903 510 4704 5665 
R² 0.76 0.26 0.77 0.64 0.32 0.28 
Market-based forecasts 
  Daily Monthly average 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  swap3y swap5y swap10y swap3y swap5y swap10y 
6 0.187*** 0.094*** 0.060*** 0.188*** 0.093*** 0.074*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
OG . . . 0.001 -0.017 -0.031** 
       [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] 
constant 1.949*** 2.375*** 2.664*** 1.929*** 2.372*** 2.631*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] 
N 3296 3296 3296 151 151 151 
R² 0.38 0.13 0.08 0.37 0.11 0.11 
6 0.182*** 0.091*** 0.056*** 0.169*** 0.084*** 0.053*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
GDP 0.155*** 0.102*** 0.120*** 0.015** 0 0.004 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
constant 1.951*** 2.377*** 2.666*** 1.957*** 2.390*** 2.670*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] 
N 3277 3277 3277 151 151 151 
R² 0.42 0.16 0.12 0.39 0.10 0.08 
            (continued) 
 
                                                   
26 Over a longer time period, including data from a less transparent period of time, economic agents (household and industry) 
might have been more backward than forward-looking, which may impede them using potentially available information and 
thus make more accurate forecasts. The same kind of reasoning can be applied to experimental data. Indeed, in contrast to 
participants in Adam’s and Pfajfar and Zakelj’s experiments, participants in the experiments by Cornand and M’baye where 
in some treatments provided with the inflation target of the central bank, which possibly induced more forward-looking 
behavior. 
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Table 6 reports results from the estimation of the equation of inflation expectation determination (6); 
it also reports estimates of equation (6) when considering GDP growth instead of output gap for field 
data.  
Table 6 continued - Forecast determination 
Survey forecasts 
  Livingston Michigan SPF   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
  living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
6 0.202*** 0.212*** 0.255*** 0.458*** 0.398*** 0.453*** 0.416***   
  [0.06] [0.06] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05]   
OG 0,015 0,023 0,014 -0,051 -0,045 -0,005 -0,047   
  [0.09] [0.08] [0.01] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]   
constant 1.957*** 2.081*** 2.372*** 1.146*** 1.435*** 1.438*** 1.707***   
  [0.19] [0.18] [0.05] [0.12] [0.13] [0.14] [0.13]   
N 62 62 373 124 124 124 124   
R² 0,17 0,20 0,37 0,51 0,40 0,42 0,41   
6 0.184*** 0.195*** 0.264*** 0.446*** 0.384*** 0.438*** 0.400***   
  [0.06] [0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]   
GDP 0.131** 0.132** -0,009 0.060* 0.089*** 0.128*** 0.101***   
  [0.06] [0.06] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]   
constant 1.668*** 1.788*** 2.366*** 1.025*** 1.247*** 1.152*** 1.494***   
  [0.22] [0.22] [0.05] [0.14] [0.15] [0.16] [0.15]   
N 62 62 373 124 124 124 124   
R² 0,23 0,26 0,373 0,52 0,43 0,47 0,45   
Central bank forecasts 
  FOMC Greenbook 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
6 0.670*** 0.539*** 0.230*** 0.227*** 0,114 0.243*** -0,015 0.073*** 
  [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.02] 
OG -0.104** -0,07 -0,077 -0,035 0,1 -0,055 0,101 -0,032 
  [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.09] [0.06] [0.09] [0.03] 
constant 0.718*** 1.122*** 1.585*** 1.545*** 2.332*** 1.835*** 1.803*** 1.308*** 
  [0.12] [0.12] [0.15] [0.15] [0.25] [0.18] [0.24] [0.08] 
N 124 124 104 104 104 104 52 52 
R² 0,64 0,56 0,23 0,22 0,04 0,19 0,03 0,16 
6 0.664*** 0.529*** 0.227*** 0.223*** 0,112 0.238*** -0,018 0.070*** 
  [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.02] 
GDP 0,028 0.081*** 0,006 0,042 0.135** 0.078* 0,102 -0,008 
  [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06] [0.02] 
constant 0.658*** 0.938*** 1.573*** 1.442*** 1.992*** 1.644*** 1.629*** 1.330*** 
  [0.15] [0.14] [0.17] [0.17] [0.29] [0.20] [0.25] [0.09] 
N 124 124 104 104 104 104 52 52 
R² 0,63 0,57 0,22 0,23 0,08 0,21 0,05 0,14 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (6) with OLS. Market-
based forecasts are considered at a daily or monthly frequency, Livingston has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC 
and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj 
(2018), Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye (2018) and CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye (2016). For 
market-based forecasts, the forecasting horizon is 3, 5 and 10 years. For surveys, the horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-
year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter 
and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
 
We observe that all categories of economic agents significantly consider lagged inflation when forming 
their inflation expectations. In terms of amplitude of the response of forecasts to lagged inflation, 
market-based data are those that respond less strongly. In other samples, responses seem 
comparable. Results in terms of amplitude should be considered cautiously though, as the sample 
frequencies may impede comparisons. 
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Output gap enters significantly the formation of inflation expectations for experimental data (but 
inflation matters more than output gap except in Adam). By contrast, output gap does not matter for 
industry, professional forecasters, households, financial market participants, and central bankers 
(except in some cases: swap10y and fomc_cy).27 Notice that output gap is observed by participants in 
the considered experiments, while it is usually not in the field. Instead, GDP growth can be observed 
in the field. Table 6 shows that GDP growth significantly and positively enters the determination of 
inflation forecasts on field data (some exceptions are swap5y, swap10y for market-based forecasts and 
household data).  
These results on field data are in line with the literature (Mavroeidis et al., 2014), which usually finds 
no significant effect of output gap (or output growth gap) on inflation forecast, but a positive and 
significant effect of GDP growth. Table G in Appendix confirms the analysis presented in Table 6 over 
a longer period of time for survey and central bank’s forecasts and when fixed effects are considered 
for experimental data. It nevertheless shows that output gap significantly enters forecast 
determination for industry data and to some extent (short term horizon) for professional forecasters 
data. Regarding GDP growth, Table G shows that the analysis remains the same on the full sample.28 
Result 3: For all categories of agents, inflation forecasts depend on lagged inflation. Regarding the 
dependence of inflation forecasts on real activity variables, output gap affects experimental inflation 
forecasts, while GDP growth affects all categories of field expectations. 
This result raises two points. First, our result is in line with the empirical literature and complements it 
by providing a systematic analysis across different categories of economic agents.29 Second, it is 
particularly interesting to observe that experimental data differ from all other types of data in that the 
forecasts of experimental subjects also significantly rely on output gap in addition to lagged inflation. 
This difference may arguably come from an experimenter demand effect.30 In the field, output gap is 
unobserved (its estimation may however differ across the different categories of agents). Moreover, 
forming inflation expectations is a task that may interfere with other tasks and that can possibly be 
influenced by various kinds of quantitative and qualitative information in a noisy and complex 
environment. Because laboratory experiments offer a stylized context and select a few specific 
information to be disclosed to participants, experimental subjects may particularly be prone to such 
demand effect. In the experiments mentioned in the present paper, instructions and screens 
participants observe describe the main macroeconomic variables of the stylized economy to 
participants. Output gap is one of them, on the same level as lagged inflation. While experimental data 
may not be externally valid with respect to the usual determinants of forecasts, it is worth noting that 
the experimenter demand effect does not seem to have had consequences for the other tests of 
external validity (namely forecast accuracy and informational frictions as examined in previous 
                                                   
27 Note that when significant, output gap negatively affects expected inflation, which sounds surprising. 
28 Table K reported in the Appendix provides estimations of equation (6) when considering the unemployment gap instead of 
the output gap for field data. Using this alternative activity variable (for which measurement error is lower), Table K shows 
that the coefficient 7Unemp gap is negative in most of our samples, in line with the literature. 
29 The literature has indeed mainly focused on single (or less numerous) data sets. Using the Michigan survey data on inflation 
expectations, Lanne et al. (2009) show that households use past release of actual inflation (rather than the forward-looking 
forecast) to form their inflation expectations. Dräger et al. (2016) focus on consumers and professional forecasters and 
analyze to what extent their expectations are in line with the Fisher equation, the Phillips curve, and the Taylor rule. Fendel 
et al. (2010) show that professional forecasters use the expectations-augmented Phillips curve model when they forecast 
macroeconomic variables. 
30 "Experimenter demand effects […] refer to changes in behavior by experimental subjects due to cues about what constitutes 
appropriate behavior (behavior ‘demanded’ from them)" (Zizzo, p.75, 2010). 
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Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Alternatively, we could interpret this result as complementary to what is 
observed owing to field data. By somehow forcing participants to care about output gap, the 
experimenter can observe how output gap is taken into account in inflation expectations, which cannot 
be done using noisy field data.  
4. Conclusion  
While it is crucial for experimental inflation forecasts to be valid outside the laboratory to be useful for 
policymakers and policy initiatives, the issue of the external validity of laboratory experiments in terms 
of inflation expectation formation has hardly been studied. The contribution of the present paper is 
twofold. First, it provides an overview for different categories of agents (participants to experiments, 
households, industry, professional forecasters, financial market participants and central bankers) on 
inflation expectations according to three dimensions: forecast accuracy, information frictions, and 
usual determinants of inflation forecasts. On top of offering a systematic comparison between 
different categories of economic agents, this wide picture on inflation expectations allows to evaluate 
the external validity of experimental data.  
Overall, our different sets exhibit some common features, but also present some heterogeneity. 
Regarding common patterns (for which experimental data are not an exception): 
 forecast errors are large and forecast accuracy is comparable; 
 forecasts are subject to information frictions. In particular, autocorrelations of forecast errors 
are positive and significant; 
 lagged inflation, which is a standard determinant of inflation expectations, is robust to the data 
sets. 
By contrast, among features of dissent, we can note the specific status of central bank’s forecasts. The 
latter exhibit superiority as they are not systematically biased (contrasting with all other data sets), 
they are less autocorrelated, forecast errors are not predictable owing to forecast revision (in contrast 
to all other data except those of professional forecasters), and forecast revisions are not predictable 
owing to past forecast revisions. 
Comparing experimental data to each other set of data excluding central bank forecasts, we observe 
that  
 forecast errors exhibit the same kind of bias (except for industry’s forecasts); 
 lagged forecast revisions enter significantly and usually negatively in forecast revisions. 
We also observe that experimental data may be closer to survey (households, professional forecasters) 
data in some respects (autocorrelation in forecast errors and predictability of forecast revision31) and 
closer to data extracted from financial markets in some other respects (forecast errors on forecast 
revisions). Note that such finding was a priori not obvious: experimental data are closer to survey data 
in the sense that both provide direct observations of expectations. However, the former are 
incentivized while the latter are not. In this respect experimental data could be closer to financial 
market participants’ forecasts.  
                                                   
31 By contrast, financial market participants’ forecasts exhibit stronger autocorrelation in forecast errors and the predictability 
of forecast revisions is more pronounced than in the other sets. 
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We thus conclude that there is as much heterogeneity among the different sets, once excluding central 
bank forecasts. There is thus no reason to oppose experimental data to field data, as the latter do not 
form a more homogenous group when we exclude experimental data.  
Finally, our results raise a few concerns, remarks and possible avenues for research that we now 
discuss. The main diverging observation between experimental forecasts and other types of forecasts 
relates to the fact that the former include output gap into the determination of inflation forecast while 
the latter do not, which can possibly be attributed to an experimenter demand effect. While such a 
feature did not have huge consequences in terms of forecast accuracy neither information rigidity in 
comparison to other data sets, a potential consequence is that the design of experiments intending to 
elicit forecasts – in particular LtFEs – may have to be revisited. In particular, the way information about 
macroeconomic variables is presented may have to be presented in a different manner.  
Going one step further, depending on the context the experimenter intends to mimic and especially 
depending on the type of expectation (household, firms, etc.) he intends to capture, this study could 
be used by the experimenter in order to design the experiment in such a way that participants playing 
the role of household or firm or financial market participant would reach on average the forecast 
properties that we find on field data in the paper. This would help reproduce stylized facts in the 
laboratory, as a precondition for simulating the impact of alternative policies measures in a cost-
effective way in the laboratory. While we do not expect usual undergraduate student participants to 
experiments to achieve the same forecasting performance as highly qualified professional central 
bankers, a way to mimic their performance in the laboratory could be to provide an appropriate 
training to participants (for instance, Petersen (2014) shows that making forecast errors salient helps 
participants reducing these errors) on top of providing the correct incentives.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A - Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Experimental forecasts 
All obs. 39 100 3.734 1.732 -13.900 52.000 
PZ 15 120 3.057 2.204 -13.900 52.000 
Adam 520 4.058 1.437 0.100 10.930 
CMB1 4 800 5.296 0.999 3.000 16.000 
CMB2 5 760 4.875 0.522 0.000 16.000 
HMW 12 900 3.424 0.834 -5.000 12.000 
Market-based forecasts 
Daily 
swap3y 3 297 2.332 0.443 0.285 4.650 
swap5y 3 297 2.568 0.373 1.139 3.277 
swap10y 3 297 2.789 0.315 1.773 3.460 
Monthly 
swap3y 152 2.318 0.452 0.547 3.177 
swap5y 152 2.564 0.382 1.266 3.229 
swap10y 152 2.785 0.315 1.972 3.368 
Survey forecasts 
Livingston 
living6m 124 3.081 2.103 0.060 10.670 
living12m 124 3.240 2.054 0.250 10.270 
Michigan 
mich1y 481 3.605 1.706 0.400 10.400 
SPF 
pgdp3q 197 3.518 2.067 0.734 9.942 
pgdp6q 192 3.490 1.803 1.457 8.690 
cpi3q 146 2.918 1.220 0.604 7.928 
cpi6q 146 3.140 1.213 1.847 7.926 
Central bank forecasts 
FOMC 
fomc_cy 154 3.061 2.097 0.400 10.250 
fomc_ny 154 3.140 1.903 1.050 9.500 
Greebook 
pgdpf1q 173 3.642 2.384 0.100 11.500 
pgdpf4q 165 3.396 2.059 0.800 9.500 
cpif1q 133 3.531 2.824 -3.200 15.100 
cpif4q 133 3.234 1.893 0.900 9.800 
pcef1q 52 1.763 1.179 -1.800 5.900 
pcef4q 52 1.490 0.440 0.700 2.400 
Note : Livingston has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC and Greenbook 
are taken at a quarterly frequency. For experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018), 
Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 those from Cornand 
and M’baye (2016) , and HMW those from Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). 
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Table B - Forecast errors 
Survey forecasts 
  Livingston Michigan SPF   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
  living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
β1 0.616*** 0.450** -0.024 0.018 -0.056 -0.073 -0.424***   
 [0.18] [0.20] [0.07] [0.09] [0.13] [0.08] [0.10]   
N 123 122 480 195 187 145 142   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
β1 -0.115* -0.391*** 0.092 0.164 -0.08 -0.04 0.286 0.558** 
 [0.07] [0.10] [0.09] [0.12] [0.15] [0.18] [0.19] [0.26] 
N 154 150 172 161 132 129 51 48 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (1) with OLS for the 
full sample period for survey and central bank forecasts. Livingston has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC 
and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For surveys, the horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for 
Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC 
and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
 
 
Table C - Absolute forecast errors 
Survey forecasts 
  Livingston Michigan SPF   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
  living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
β2 1.468*** 1.543*** 1.039*** 0.974*** 1.312*** 0.692*** 0.976***   
 [0.14] [0.15] [0.05] [0.06] [0.09] [0.05] [0.07]   
N 123 122 480 195 187 145 142   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
β2 0.641*** 0.949*** 0.924*** 1.137*** 1.190*** 1.530*** 1.042*** 1.421*** 
 [0.04] [0.07] [0.06] [0.09] [0.11] [0.13] [0.13] [0.18] 
N 154 150 172 161 132 129 51 48 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (2) with OLS for the 
full sample period for survey and central bank forecasts. Livingston has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC 
and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For surveys, the horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for 
Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC 
and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
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Table D - Autocorrelation of forecast errors 
Experimental forecasts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
 All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW   
β3 0.523*** 0.677*** 0.106** 0.138*** 0.189*** 0.449***   
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.05] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]   
constant -0.029 0.016 -0.098 0.04 -0.247*** 0.061   
 [0.13] [0.11] [0.45] [0.09] [0.06] [0.08]   
N 37748 14688 500 4608 5568 12384   
R² 0.30 0.45 0.02 0.29 0.09 0.24   
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q  
β3 0.311*** 0.496*** 0.921*** 0.533*** 0.779*** 0.596*** 0.769***  
 [0.09] [0.08] [0.02] [0.06] [0.05] [0.07] [0.05]  
constant 0.403** 0.208 -0.005 0.003 -0.028 -0.042 -0.086  
 [0.18] [0.18] [0.03] [0.08] [0.08] [0.06] [0.07]  
N 122 121 479 194 183 144 141  
R² 0.10 0.25 0.85 0.29 0.61 0.37 0.60  
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
β3 0.689*** 0.845*** 0.437*** 0.783*** 0.157* 0.318*** 0,223 0.321** 
 [0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.05] [0.09] [0.08] [0.14] [0.14] 
constant -0.026 -0.064 0.042 0.023 -0.09 -0.045 0.259 0.372 
 [0.05] [0.06] [0.08] [0.08] [0.15] [0.18] [0.19] [0.27] 
N 153 149 171 153 131 128 50 47 
R² 0.49 0.72 0.19 0.58 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.10 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (3) with OLS for the full 
sample period for survey and central bank forecasts and includes fixed effects for experimental forecasts. Livingston has a semiannual 
frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For 
experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018), Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye 
(2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye (2016), and HMW those of Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For surveys, the horizon for 
Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the horizon is the current 
and next calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
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Table E - Forecast errors on forecast revisions 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW     
β4 0.065*** 0.231*** 0.314*** -0.384*** -0.365*** -0.141***     
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.07] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
constant -0.114 0.12 0.339 -0.004 0.091* 0.230**     
 [0.15] [0.14] [0.43] [0.08] [0.05] [0.10]     
N 38423 14903 510 4704 5664 12642     
R² 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.51 0.23 0.05     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
β4 0.577** 1.232*** -0.498*** 0.275 0.555* -0.259 0.009   
 [0.26] [0.35] [0.15] [0.18] [0.31] [0.16] [0.34]   
constant 0.584*** 0.411** -0.028 0.014 -0.089 -0.095 -0.413***   
 [0.18] [0.19] [0.06] [0.09] [0.13] [0.07] [0.10]   
N 122 121 479 194 183 144 141   
R² 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
β4 0.029 0.425 -0.043 0.525** 0.153* -0.008 0.193 -0.549 
 [0.17] [0.29] [0.10] [0.22] [0.09] [0.49] [0.13] [1.10] 
constant -0.103 -0.374*** 0.081 0.085 -0.09 -0.062 0.329* 0.544** 
 [0.07] [0.10] [0.09] [0.12] [0.15] [0.19] [0.19] [0.27] 
N 153 149 171 153 131 128 50 47 
R² 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (4) with OLS for the 
full sample period for survey and central bank forecasts and includes fixed effects for experimental forecasts. Livingston has a semiannual 
frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For 
experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018), Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye 
(2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye (2016), and HMW those from Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For surveys, the 
forecasting horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the 
horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
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Table F - Forecast revisions on lagged forecast revisions 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW     
β5 0.077*** 0.258*** -0.156*** -0.471*** -0.441*** 0.051***     
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
constant -0,062 0,006 -0,027 0,017 -0,01 0,016     
 [0.14] [0.14] [0.28] [0.12] [0.06] [0.10]     
N 37748 14687 500 4608 5568 12385     
R² 0,01 0,07 0,02 0,25 0,21 0,01     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
β5 0,028 0,113 -0.236*** -0,104 -0.253*** -0.194** -0,11   
 [0.09] [0.09] [0.04] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08]   
constant 0,005 0,008 -0,009 -0,004 -0,011 -0,046 -0.044*   
 [0.06] [0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.02]   
N 122 122 479 195 186 144 144   
R² 0,00 0,01 0,06 0,01 0,07 0,04 0,01   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
β5 -0,018 -0,035 -0.354*** -0,063 -0.287*** 0,055 -0,218 0,122 
 [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.14] [0.14] 
constant -0.056* -0.051* -0,02 -0,028 -0,126 -0,049 -0,045 -0,013 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.07] [0.04] [0.14] [0.03] [0.20] [0.03] 
N 152 152 171 154 131 131 50 50 
R² 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.02 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (5) with OLS for the 
full sample period for survey and central bank forecasts and includes fixed effects for experimental forecasts. Livingston has a semiannual 
frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For 
experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018), Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye 
(2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye (2016), and HMW those from Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For surveys, the 
forecasting horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the 
horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
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Table G - Forecast determination 
Experimental forecasts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
  All w/o PZ PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW   
6 0.634*** 1.011*** 0.372*** 0.596*** 0.105*** 0.992***   
 [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01]   
OG -0.255*** . -0.210*** -0.288*** -0.047*** -0.284***   
 [0.01]  [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01]   
constant 1.219*** -0.039 2.610*** 1.730*** 4.371*** 0.061   
 [0.09] [0.09] [0.10] [0.17] [0.10] [0.07]   
N 23980 15120 520 4800 5760 12900   
R² 0.76 0.89 0.85 0.44 0.26 0.70     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
  living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q  
6 0.595*** 0.580*** 0.545*** 0.668*** 0.551*** 0.549*** 0.537***  
 [0.04] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04]  
OG 0.150** 0.166*** -0,002 0.146*** 0.168*** 0.045 0.024  
 [0.06] [0.06] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]  
constant 0.908*** 1.123*** 1.645*** 0.776*** 1.256*** 1.294*** 1.552***  
 [0.17] [0.16] [0.05] [0.10] [0.11] [0.12] [0.13]  
N 123 123 480 196 191 146 146  
R² 0.70 0.70 0.82 0.86 0.77 0.62 0.60  
6 0.590*** 0.575*** 0.544*** 0.669*** 0.557*** 0.556*** 0.544***  
 [0.04] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]  
GDP 0.098** 0.111** -0.008 0.160*** 0.207*** 0.127*** 0.130***  
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]  
constant 0.625*** 0.801*** 1.661*** 0.323*** 0.661*** 0.932*** 1.181***  
 [0.24] [0.23] [0.06] [0.12] [0.13] [0.14] [0.15]  
N 123 123 480 196 196 191 146  
R² 0.70 0.70 0.82 0.87 0.80 0.67 0.65   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
6 0.738*** 0.647*** 0.587*** 0.494*** 0.624*** 0.450*** -0.015 0.073*** 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.02] 
OG -0.036 -0.035 0.024 0.094** 0.036 0.004 0.101 -0.032 
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.09] [0.06] [0.09] [0.03] 
constant 0.571*** 0.958*** 1.057*** 1.243*** 1.272*** 1.603*** 1.803*** 1.308*** 
 [0.11] [0.12] [0.17] [0.16] [0.28] [0.17] [0.24] [0.08] 
N 153 153 172 164 133 133 52 52 
R² 0.83 0.77 0.68 0.64 0.46 0.54 0.03 0.16 
6 0.751*** 0.669*** 0.594*** 0.499*** 0.650*** 0.473*** -0.018 0.070*** 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04] [0.07] [0.02] 
GDP 0.063* 0.117*** 0.057* 0.106*** 0.142** 0.113*** 0.102 -0.008 
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06] [0.02] 
constant 0.367** 0.581*** 0.866*** 0.936*** 0.797** 1.215*** 1.629*** 1.330*** 
 [0.16] [0.16] [0.20] [0.18] [0.34] [0.21] [0.25] [0.09] 
N 153 153 172 164 133 133 52 52 
R² 0.83 0.78 0.69 0.66 0.48 0.57 0.05 0.14 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (6) with OLS for the full 
sample period for survey and central bank forecasts and includes fixed effects for experimental forecasts. Livingston has a semiannual frequency, 
Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For experimental data: 
PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018), Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 those 
from Cornand and M’baye (2016), and HMW those from Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For surveys, the forecasting horizon for Livingston 
is 6 or 12 months, for Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the horizon is the current and next 
calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
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Table G - Forecast errors on current and past inflation forecasts 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW     
H1 -0.062*** 0.098*** -0.624*** -0.692*** -0.642*** -0.473***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
H2 -0.198*** -0.371*** -1.237*** 0.077*** 0.087*** -0.182***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
constant 0.964*** 0.796*** 7.537*** 3.148*** 2.709*** 2.307***     
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.31] [0.04] [0.05] [0.02]     
N 38423 14903 510 4704 5664 12642     
R² 0.20 0.27 0.58 0.73 0.48 0.54     
Market-based forecasts 
 Daily Monthly average     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
 swap3y swap5y swap10y swap3y swap5y swap10y     
H1 -1.133*** -0.757*** -0.332 -1.386*** -0.576 0.235     
 [0.18] [0.24] [0.68] [0.45] [0.48] [1.36]     
H2 -0.046 0.149 -0.018 0,107 0,134 -0.526     
 [0.18] [0.24] [0.68] [0.45] [0.48] [1.27]     
constant 2.165*** 0.598* -0.901 2.388** 0.146 -1.067     
 [0.20] [0.31] [0.60] [0.94] [1.38] [3.21]     
N 2513 1991 686 115 91 31     
R² 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.01     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
H1 -0.771** -0.795 0.02 -0.194 -0.215 -0.19 -0.632   
 [0.38] [0.51] [0.18] [0.23] [0.39] [0.20] [0.51]   
H2 0.515 0.711 0.541*** -0.114 -0.214 0.272 0.561   
 [0.38] [0.50] [0.18] [0.23] [0.39] [0.20] [0.50]   
constant 0.745 0.144 -2.113*** 0.532** 0.716*** -0.208 -0.023   
 [0.69] [0.70] [0.30] [0.22] [0.26] [0.25] [0.33]   
N 61 60 372 122 119 123 120   
R² 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.02 0.02   
Central bank forecasts 
  FOMC Greenbook 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
H1 -0.212 0.223 -0.443*** -0.165 0.012 -0.811 -0.03 -1.103 
 [0.20] [0.39] [0.12] [0.24] [0.11] [0.71] [0.16] [1.11] 
H2 0.151 -0.368 -0.023 -0.430* -0.278** 0.434 -0.404** -0.004 
 [0.21] [0.39] [0.12] [0.24] [0.11] [0.71] [0.16] [1.11] 
constant 0.216 0.304 1.083*** 1.366*** 0.920*** 1.227** 1.092*** 2.200** 
 [0.17] [0.26] [0.23] [0.23] [0.35] [0.49] [0.40] [0.93] 
N 124 120 103 100 103 100 50 47 
R² 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.29 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.08 
 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating with OLS the following equation: 
FEt.t+h = 𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽𝐻1𝜋t+h/t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛽𝐻2 𝜋t+h−1/t−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. where 𝛽𝐻1 and 𝛽𝐻2 are the estimated coefficients. 𝐶𝐻 is a constant.  𝜖𝑖𝑡  is the error 
term (i stands for the different categories of economic agents) and the null hypothesis is: the estimated coefficients 𝛽𝐻1 and 𝛽𝐻2are not 
significantly different from 0. Market-based forecasts are considered at a daily or monthly frequency. Livingston has a semiannual frequency. 
Michigan monthly. SPF quarterly. FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each sample. For experimental 
data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018). Adam those from Adam (2008). CMB1 those from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 
those from Cornand and M’baye (2016), and HMW those from Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). For market-based forecasts. the 
forecasting horizon is 3. 5 and 10 years. For surveys. the horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months. for Michigan 1-year. and for SPF 1-quarter 
and 4-quarter. For central bank’s forecasts. the horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for 
Greenbook. 
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Table I - Forecast errors on current and past inflation forecasts 
Experimental forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW     
H1 -0.101*** 0.098*** -0.682*** -0.676*** -0.736*** -0.520***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
H2 -0.236*** -0.370*** -1.294*** 0.093*** -0.006 -0.227***     
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]     
constant 1.549*** 0.472*** 7.455*** 2.967*** 3.754*** 2.525***     
 [0.13] [0.13] [0.39] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07]     
N 38423 14903 510 4704 5664 12642     
R² 0.28 0.28 0.60 0.79 0.59 0.60     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
H1 0.609** 1.218*** -0.217* 0.296* 0.533* -0.296* -0.515   
 [0.27] [0.36] [0.11] [0.18] [0.32] [0.17] [0.33]   
H2 -0.553** -1.241*** 0.767*** -0.251 -0.574* 0.255 0.11   
 [0.26] [0.36] [0.11] [0.18] [0.31] [0.16] [0.31]   
constant 0.41 0.488 -2.013*** -0.146 0.057 0.022 0.851***   
 [0.33] [0.37] [0.12] [0.18] [0.30] [0.20] [0.27]   
N 122 121 479 194 183 144 141   
R² 0.04 0.09 0.45 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.15   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
H1 -0.18 -0.123 -0.062 0.505** -0.016 -0.459 -0.03 -1.103 
 [0.17] [0.27] [0.10] [0.22] [0.09] [0.49] [0.16] [1.11] 
H2 0.049 -0.205 0.022 -0.551** -0.245*** 0.107 -0.404** -0.004 
 [0.16] [0.26] [0.10] [0.23] [0.09] [0.47] [0.16] [1.11] 
constant 0.285** 0.639*** 0.229 0.244 0.824*** 1.074*** 1.092*** 2.200** 
 [0.11] [0.17] [0.17] [0.23] [0.23] [0.36] [0.40] [0.93] 
N 153 149 171 153 131 128 50 47 
R² 0.11 0.27 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.10 0.13 0.08 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating with OLS the following equation 
for the full sample period for survey and central bank’s forecasts and including fixed effects for experimental forecasts: FEt.t+h = 𝐶𝐻 +
𝛽𝐻1𝜋t+h\t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛽𝐻2 𝜋t+h−1\t−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 . where 𝛽𝐻1 and 𝛽𝐻2 are the estimated coefficients. 𝐶𝐻 is a constant.  𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term (i stands for 
the different categories of economic agents) and the null hypothesis is: the estimated coefficients 𝛽𝐻1 and 𝛽𝐻2are not significantly different 
from 0. Livingston has a semiannual frequency. Michigan monthly. SPF quarterly. FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. 
N is the size of each sample. For experimental data: PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018). Adam those from Adam (2008). CMB1 
those from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye (2016), and HMW those from Hommes, Massaro and Weber 
(2017). For surveys. the forecasting horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months. for Michigan 1-year. and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For 
central bank’s forecasts. the horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
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Table J - Experimental data by group 
Equation (1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW 
β1 -0.005 -0.042* -0.022 -0.116*** 0.007 0.064*** 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.13] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
N 6001 1656 510 784 944 2107 
Equation (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW 
β2 0.542*** 0.573*** 1.813*** 0.329*** 0.258*** 0.418*** 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.10] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
N 6001 1656 510 784 944 2107 
Equation (3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW 
β3 0.341*** 0.850*** 0.115** 0.626*** -0.019 0.553*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] 
constant -0.007 -0.001 -0.022 -0.040*** 0.009 0.014 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.13] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
N 5892 1632 500 768 928 2064 
R² 0.12 0.70 0.01 0.42 0.00 0.32 
Equation (4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW 
β4 0.472*** 0.848*** 0.314*** -0.051*** -0.034 0.273*** 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.07] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] 
constant -0.003 -0.034** -0.017 -0.116*** 0.007 0.064*** 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.12] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
N 6001 1656 510 784 944 2107 
R² 0.13 0.57 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.06 
Equation (5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW 
β5 0.221*** 0.777*** -0.156*** -0.440*** -0.611*** 0.418*** 
 [0.01] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] 
constant 0.001 0.002 -0.011 -0.019 0.002 0.019** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.08] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
N 5893 1632 500 768 928 2065 
R² 0.05 0.62 0.02 0.27 0.38 0.20 
Equation (6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All obs. PZ Adam CMB1 CMB2 HMW 
β6 0.439*** 0.946*** -0.248*** 0.646*** 0.616*** 0.848*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] 
Β7OG -0.280*** . -0.560*** -0.390*** -0.064*** -0.194*** 
 [0.01]   [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
constant 2.351*** 0.192*** 4.973*** 1.845*** 1.885*** 0.528*** 
 [0.05] [0.03] [0.09] [0.14] [0.08] [0.07] 
N 4346 1656 510 784 944 2108 
R² 0.48 0.86 0.64 0.68 0.62 0.71 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating 
equations (1) to (6) with OLS. The individual data are average for each group in each experiment. N is the size 
of each sample. PZ indicates data from Pfajfar and Zakelj (2018), Adam those from Adam (2008), CMB1 those 
from Cornand and M’baye (2018), CMB2 those from Cornand and M’baye (2016), and HMW those from 
Hommes, Massaro and Weber (2017). 
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Table K - Forecast determination, unemployment gap     
                                           Market-based forecasts     
  Daily Monthly average     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
  swap3y swap5y swap10y swap3y swap5y swap10y     
6 0.186*** 0.094*** 0.061*** 0.223*** 0.117*** 0.079***   
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]   
7Unemp gap 0,348 0,193 0,12 0.354** 0.455*** 0.355***   
 [0.94] [0.93] [0.81] [0.15] [0.16] [0.13]   
constant 1.950*** 2.375*** 2.664*** 1.860*** 2.324*** 2.623***   
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04]   
N 3297 3297 3297 152 152 152   
R² 0.38 0.13 0.08 0.48 0.19 0.14     
Survey forecasts 
 Livingston Michigan SPF   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
 living6m living12m mich1y pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q   
6 0.172*** 0.187*** 0.249*** 0.474*** 0.435*** 0.471*** 0.457***   
 [0.06] [0.06] [0.02] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]   
7Unemp gap -0.226** -0.188* -0.465*** 0.139 0.272** 0.121 0.299***   
 [0.10] [0.10] [0.16] [0.10] [0.11] [0.12] [0.11]   
constant 2.019*** 2.131*** 2.387*** 1.103*** 1.335*** 1.389*** 1.596***   
 [0.18] [0.18] [0.05] [0.13] [0.13] [0.15] [0.14]   
N 62 62 373 124 124 124 124   
R² 0.24 0.24 0.385 0.51 0.43 0.42 0.44   
Central bank forecasts 
 FOMC Greenbook 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 fomc_cy fomc_ny pgdp1q pgdp4q cpi1q cpi4q pce1q pce4q 
6 0.662*** 0.536*** 0.210*** 0.216*** 0,097 0.241*** -0,05 0,033 
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.02] 
7Unemp gap -0.055 -0.001 -0.203 -0.106 -0.256 -0.003 -0.425** -0.321*** 
 [0.10] [0.09] [0.14] [0.13] [0.23] [0.16] [0.20] [0.06] 
constant 0.736*** 1.127*** 1.641*** 1.574*** 2.394*** 1.838*** 1.876*** 1.399*** 
 [0.13] [0.12] [0.15] [0.15] [0.26] [0.18] [0.24] [0.07] 
N 124 124 104 104 104 104 52 52 
R² 0.63 0.55 0.23 0.23 0.04 0.18 0.08 0.48 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Parameters are obtained by estimating equation (6) with OLS, when 
considering the unemployment gap instead of the output gap. Market-based forecasts are considered at a daily or monthly frequency, Livingston 
has a semiannual frequency, Michigan monthly, SPF quarterly. FOMC and Greenbook are taken at a quarterly frequency. N is the size of each 
sample. For market-based forecasts, the forecasting horizon is 3, 5 and 10 years. For surveys, the horizon for Livingston is 6 or 12 months, for 
Michigan 1-year, and for SPF 1-quarter and 4-quarter. For central bank forecasts, the horizon is the current and next calendar years for FOMC 
and 1-quarter and 4-quarter for Greenbook. 
 
  
  
 
ABOUT OFCE 
The Paris-based Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE), or French Economic 
Observatory is an independent and publicly-funded centre whose activities focus on economic research, 
forecasting and the evaluation of public policy. 
 
Its 1981 founding charter established it as part of the French Fondation nationale des sciences politiques 
(Sciences Po), and gave it the mission is to “ensure that the fruits of scientific rigour and academic 
independence serve the public debate about the economy”. The OFCE fulfils this mission by conducting 
theoretical and empirical studies, taking part in international scientific networks, and assuring a regular 
presence in the media through close cooperation with the French and European public authorities. The work 
of the OFCE covers most fields of economic analysis, from macroeconomics, growth, social welfare 
programmes, taxation and employment policy to sustainable development, competition, innovation and 
regulatory affairs. 
 
 
ABOUT SCIENCES PO 
Sciences Po is an institution of higher education and research in the humanities and social sciences.  Its work 
in law, economics, history, political science and sociology is pursued through ten research units and several 
crosscutting programmes. 
 
Its research community includes over two hundred twenty members and three hundred fifty PhD 
candidates.  Recognized internationally, their work covers a wide range of topics including education, 
democracies, urban development, globalization and public health.   
One of Sciences Po’s key objectives is to make a significant contribution to methodological, epistemological 
and theoretical advances in the humanities and social sciences.  Sciences Po’s mission is also to share the 
results of its research with the international research community, students, and more broadly, society as a 
whole.  
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